Verified Response: Debunking The City's Playbook

Here's one simple logical truth to keep in mind while reading this: if a burglar knows the police aren't coming, he is more likely to burglarize your home or business.  But this isn't about logic, and (as we're going to show you), it isn't about cost. It's about bureaucracy and mismanagement.

Verified Response is a proposal by the City of Dallas to terminate an initial police response to a burglar alarm call. It requires that someone else (a security guard, for instance, or a neighbor) first verify that a real burglary is in progress.

Then, and only then, the police will respond.

The following responds to a "Discussion Document" which has been distributed (as a Microsoft Powerpoint presentation) to various city officials including the City Council.  The broad nature of the presentation, along with the lack of data to back up many claims, leaves questions.

We'll point out the flaws and ask about the rest.

The City's presentation is rather lengthy, and even with terse responses, it makes for a fairly long article. 

If you're the kind of person who likes to read the end of a book first, you can skip forward to OUR CONCLUSIONS (scroll to the bottom), then read backwards to find out how we got there.

Otherwise, please continue reading. You'll be glad you did.

The city's claims appear indented in italics. 

Our comments and supporting data appear around the City's claims.

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THE PROBLEM

• The Dallas Police Department received almost 62,000 burglar alarm calls in 2004

• Of these calls, 97.2% (approximately 60,100) turned out to be false alarms

• Responding to these false alarms took approximately 47,000 police officer hours

• Using DPD's calculation of 4.4 hours of active work per 8-hour shift, this is 41 police officer "full-time equivalents" (FTE's) at a cost of approximately $3.485 million dollars in police time

The claim being made by the City also translates into a cost-per-false-alarm call of $57.98 (by dividing total cost by number of calls).

It also logically follows that almost half of a police officer's shift (45%) is not "active work."  From a management perspective, this should probably be explored.  Should the department look at ways to better maximize an officer's time?

• These (the following statistics) are not unusual, but are seen in police departments across the nation:

• "The vast majority of alarm calls, between 94% and 98%, are false (higher in some jurisdictions)" --Source: U.S. Department of Justice

• False alarm dispatches are the single greatest waste of law enforcement resources in the U.S.

• 86% of the citizens and businesses without alarms are subsidizing alarm response for 14% who have alarms

This is blatantly false. In the first place, those "other" 14% pay taxes, too. Second, by adding up the city's own numbers it it's presentation (which should be given closer scrutiny), false alarms account for $4,165,000 in costs. Revenue from permit fees and fines brings in $4,632,900.

Using the city's own figures, and subtracting costs from revenue, shows the alarm program brings in a surplus of $467,900.

• Responding to false alarms takes police officers away from their primary job of fighting crime

• DPD and Special Collections are burden with tracking false alarms, permits, billing, and the collections process

• The DPD Alarm Unit consists of 2 sergeants, 4 senior corporals, and one office assistant costing approximately $500,000

What functions, specifically, are performed by these employees? What are their job descriptions?

• Special Collections has 3.6 FTE's for false alarm billing and collections, costing approximately $180,000

WHAT OTHER CITIES HAVE DONE

• Salt Lake City adopted verified response in 2000

• Ordinance 5.08.095 "False Alarms: Except for alarms at a wholesale or retail firearms business, intrusion alarm response shall be dispatched by the police department only after a private guard responder has confirmed that an attempted or actual crime has occurred at the alarm site."

• Experienced immediate 88% reduction in the number of alarm calls; by 2004, alarm calls were down 94%

• Prior to Verified Response, the average response time to alarm calls was 45 mintues ranging up to 3 hours

• Response time from private guard company is 17 minutes

• Response time to high-priority calls has decreased from 5 minutes to 3 minutes, a 40% reduction

Translated: a 2-minute reduction for things like armed robbery in progress. There is no data, however, linking Verified Response to this reduction.

• Burglaries went up 1.8% the first year, up 12% the second year, down 6.4% the third year, and are down 11% for the first half of this year (similar to past cyclical trends)

Here, let's refer to "Uniform Crime Reporting" (UCR) data collected by the FBI. Note that final figures are only available through 2003. Data from 2004 is still preliminary and, therefore, is not used.  Our source: http://www.fbi.gov/ucr/ucr.htm#cius

Salt Lake City enacted their ordinance in December, 2000:

In 2001, the first year of the program, burglaries were 11.9 per 1000.

In 2002, this number shot up 11.4% to 13.3 per 1000.

In 2003, the number dropped 3.8% to 12.819 per 1000.

All in all, Salt Lake City has seen a 6% increase in burglaries-per-1000 since Verified Response was initiated.

Side note: one problem with using UCR data is the classification of crimes. Burglar alarm calls can result in arrests for other crimes such as criminal trespass, criminal mischief or other property crimes--not just burglary.

The UCR system also does not address problems (or benefits) specific to Verified Response.  For instance, it does not reflect bodily injury or death suffered by security guards, business or homeowners responding to their own alarms.  It also doesn't reflect specific benefits of police presence where an officer would have otherwise been responding to an alarm (for instance, "this officer was able to prevent 'this' murder because she wasn't responding to 'this' false alarm").

In order to properly evaluate Verified Response, much more data must be considered over a much longer period of time than 3 years.

But since the City seems to want to use UCR and "burglary" as a barometer, let's play by their rules.

It's also worthwhile to note that they City apparently acknowledges as normal ("similar to past cyclical trends") a double-digit jump in burglaries in the first couple of years after verified response has been implemented.

Translated, is the City saying: "a double-digit jump in burglary rates is OK with us?"

• Alarm companies charge an extra $5 to $7 per month for response to alarms; minimal complaints received

There is no data to substantiate this claim, but it seems logically dubious on the surface. Nowhere, have we found citizens actively supporting verified response--quite the opposite.  But if we allow the City to make this unsubstantiated claim, why doesn't the city take the lead and hire security guards as it's own first responders? 

$4.6 million dollars is quite a bit of revenue if managed effectively.

• Las Vegas adopted verified response in 1991
  

• Dispatches on burglar alarm calls dropped from over 100,000 per year to less than 10,000 per year, a 90% reduction despite large population growth

From 2001 through 2003, Las Vegas' population grew from 1,117,763 to 1,189,388--a 6% increase.

• Burglary rates declined by 8 percent for the three years following the change in policy

This is patently false.  According to the FBI's UCR, Las Vegas' burglary rates in 2001 were 9.021 per 1,000 people. 

In 2003, that number had increased to 10.747 per 1,000 people.  This represents a 14.97% increase in burglaries-per-1000 people.

• Los Angeles recently contemplated verified response
  

• Discovered that a private guard response could provide quicker response
  

• Further, in the rare instance that an actual crime is detected, the combined response between private guard and police would be faster than police response alone due to the reduced priority given to alarm calls by police

Translated: Los Angeles considered and did not implement Verified Response. Instead, Los Angeles adopted a "zero tolerance" policy charging owners a $150 fine for the first false alarm.

If Dallas charged each alarm owner $150 for each false alarm, the city would have brought in another $9 millon dollars in revenue.  Added to the permit fees, total revenue from alarms would have topped $13.6 million dollars.

WHAT OTHER CITIES ARE DOING

• Approximately 24 cities have successfully implemented verified response including (with population): Las Vegas (1 million), Winnipeg, Canada (647,000), Salt Lake City (184,000), Milwaukee, Wisconsin (629,296), Lane County, Colorado (300,000), Aurora, Colorado (222,103), Henderson, Nevada (145,000), Fremont, California (206,856).

Again, the city's claim of "successully implemented" is purely subjective. Further, comparing Dallas to a Canadian city or largely rural areas in Colorado is "apples and oranges."

Milwaukee however, is an interesting story. Milwaukee enacted its ordinance on September 19, 2004.

Less than 6 months later on March 25, 2005, Milwaukee's Police Chief Nannette Hegerty is already calling the program a success at the same time she's calling for a new ordinance banning homeowners and business owners from checking on their own homes or businesses when an alarm sounds.  Chief Hegerty called the practice "dangerous."  

The Wisconsin Burglar and Fire Alarm Association claimed (unverified) that the number of burglaries "more than doubled" in the 6 month period since the law was enacted.

CONCLUSIONS

• Attempts to manage false alarms with warnings, fines and permits has limited effectiveness

The key is "manage."  The problem (being overreacted to today) is false alarms and the impact on revenue and efficiency.  But more on management in a moment...

• The Dallas Police Department responds to alarm calls which are false over 97% of the time

Again, the key is management.  But more on that in a moment...

• Continuing to waste police resources is not in the best interest of public safety

Finally, something subjective that everyone can agree on!

• Dallas ranks 1st among the nation's big cities in crime

Dallas' crime rate has not been linked to false alarm calls in any way! Further, Dallas should do nothing that even risks increasing crime!

• It is time to free up 45 officers to do what they do best

THE SOLUTION

• Police do not respond to a burglar alarm signal

• Police will be dispatched after being contacted by an individual (who) has visually verified that a crime as or is occurring

Again, before proposing Verified Response, more research should be done into such things as: injuries sustained by private individuals responding to burglar alarm calls and missed opportunities to catch and stop crooks.

• Alarm companies may use their own resources or private security guard responders to verify

• Police Department continues responding to the human activated alarms, such as hold-ups, panic and duress
  

COMPLIANCE WITH STATE BILL 568

• Recently passed state bill

• Allows no police response to a burglar alarm signal if:

• --A reasonable effort is made to notifyk permit holders of intention to adopt the ordinance; and

• --A public hearing is conducted which gives persons interested in the response of the municipality to alarm systems the opportunity to be heard

• The plan to comply with this bill includes:

• Not responding to a burglar alarm signal (commercial and residential)

• Dallas Police response to human activated alarms, such as hold-ups, panic and duress (commercial and residential)

Though it should go without saying: the police will also still respond to 911 phone calls for help--the logical equivalent of a hold-up or panic alarm. One, you're reporting crime with a phone call. The other, someone is reporting a crime with a button.

• Assess fines for every false hold-up, panic, or duress call (no "freebies"): Residential, $100 per response; Commercial, $100 for first, $200 for second, $300 for third, $400 for fourth and beyond

• Continue issuing permits and charging permit fees for commercial sites; Increase fees to $100

In essence, double the permit fees on businesses and eliminate virtually every service. Does that sum it up?

• Discontinue permit fees for residential; but still require annual registration

BENEFITS FOR CITIZENS

• Reduced response time to alarm calls from private guards

There is no data to substantiate this claim.

• Reduced response time to actual police service needs

Again, there is no data to support this claim. One could also speculate that call times to "true" burglary calls would increase. These are not taken into account in this estimate. But since there's no way to substantiate either claim, it (like most of this proposal) is simply invalid and lacks rudimentary research.

• More personal service from private guards

If "personal service" or "customer satisfaction" is the issue, why does the City not take the lead and craft a security guard response program itself? "More personal service" is another subjective and baseless claim.

• No longer pay for residential permit

But we're going to "sock it to" businesses by doubling their fees, then reduce service to zero.

• 86% of the citizens and businesses without alarms are no longer subsidizing alarm response

Again, by the City's own numbers, this "86% subsidizing" figure is blatantly false and misleading.

Who did the City's research, and did they add up their own numbers that were put into the City's own presentation?

BENEFITS FOR THE CITY

• Allow police officers to focus on true crime rather than wasting time responding to false alarms

By the city's numbers, while 60,100 calls turned out false, 1,900 alarm calls turned out to be valid.  Perhaps this would appear in a category other than "true crime?"

• Improve morale of police officers

I hope there is data to back up the statement that a false alarm call damages a police officer's morale.

Better management and fair pay, it seems, would go quite a bit further toward improving morale of police officers. 

Just an observation!

• Redeploy officers from Alarm Unit to needed areas

It would be interesting to see the job descriptions of these positions, and the need for such senior sworn staff (sergeants and senior corporals) in such positions managing alarm permits.

• Redeploy administrative resources by no longer charging a fee, tracking, and renewing residential alarm permits or billing and collecting for excessive residential false alarms.

Yes, the current administrative resources could be used to track the double fees for businesses!

• Reduce call volume for dispatchers

• Collect fines for every false panic, duress, or hold-up call (no "freebies")-both residential and commercial

If a fine structure is planned, why not collect fines for every false 911 call--the logical equivalent of a panic, duress or "hold-up" call?  Why limit fines merely to alarm systems? 

Are we simply saying that we just don't like burglar alarms?

• More severe penalties for commercial sites that repeatedly initiate false panic, duress, or hold-up calls

The statistics identifying false panic, duress or hold-ups as a "problem" were not included in the City's presentation.  It would be interesting to see these numbers.

ANNUAL REVENUE IMPACT

• Current Policy

• Alarm permit fees: $3,757,750

• Excessive false alarm service fines: $142,150

• Additional revenue from 10/1/05 commercial permit fee increase: $733,000

• Total: $4,632,900
  

• Proposed Policy Estimates

• Alarm permit fees (commercial only): $1,482,400

• Fines for false panic, dures, or hold-up calls (residential): $242,200

• Fines for false panic, duress or hold-up calls (commercial, including escalation for repeat offenders: $564,600

• Total: $2,289,200

• Estimated Net Revenue Loss: ($2,343,700)

Let's reiterate that: a $2,343,700 net loss in revenue. 

MONETARY BENEFITS

• Eliminate DPD officer time spent responding to false alarms, allowing them to focus on true crime

• 41 FTE's x $85,000 annual all-inclusive cost = $3,485,000

• Redeploy partial resources in DPD Alarm Unit (Today: 2 Sergeants, 4 Senior Corporals, 1 Office Assistant)

• 4 FTE's x $85,000 annual all-inclusive cost = $340,000

• Redeploy partial resources in Special Collections for false alarm billing and collections (Today: 3.6 FTE's)

• 2.6 FTE's x $50,000 annual all-inclusive cost = $130,000

• Personnel costs of call-takers and dispatchers: To Be Decided (TBD)

• Total: $3,955,000

"Monetary Benefits" (cost savings) are only benefits if the cost is eliminated.

Let's translate that: in order to realize a monetary benefit, those 47.6 positions (plus some percentage of dispatchers) would need to be eliminated (the people in those positions fired).

Otherwise, Dallas taxpayers are left with making up the $2,343,700 revenue the current program generates. 

Perhaps this figure should be shown spread among the 86% of Dallas taxpayers the City claims is subsidizing the 14% with alarms?

BOTTOM LINE (Theirs, not ours)

• Enabling 45 Dallas Police Officers to focus on their primary job of reducing true crime for just over $2.3 million is a tremendously efficient use of taxpayer money

Conversely, current alarm permit fees and fines enable those same 45 Dallas Police Officers to be on the street without increasing taxes.

Alarm calls (currently "priority 3") are always lower priority than other serious crimes--which are first responded to by these "45 officers" before answering alarm calls.  

An "efficient" use of taxpayer money would not include increasing it when there is existing money paying for an existing service.

OBSTACLES TO OVERCOME

• Alarm companies and their lobbyists have fought and will continue to fight any changes to the current arrangement

Of course, some Dallas citizens and activists, completely unconnected with alarm companies and their lobbyists, might actually do their homework and show the City's lack of supporting data or logic!

• Members of the North Texas Alarm Association appeared before the Texas House of Representatives Law Enforcement Committee in August, 2004, to propose "Mandated Police Alarm Response"

And it would appear that some municipalities still succeeded in getting legislation passed that would legally allow them to "wash their hands" of responding to burglar alarms.

• Some cities that have considered verified response have backed off due to political pressure on the city council from the alarm industry and the lobbyists they hired

In Dallas' case, there's no need for lobbyists.  The City has not done its homework. 

By the City's own talking points, verified response does not reduce crime, and it drains the city of $2.3 million dollars of existing revenue.

• "When confronted with verified response, the alarm industry will send letters to alarm users in the community using emotional scare tactics and inflammatory statements.  This has been the alarm industry modus operandi throughout the nation." (source: "Verified Response Really Does Work")

What is the reason for this (alarming talk by alarm companies)?  The City has pointed out that alarm companies will charge more to cover the costs of private security.  What is the city claiming is the "alarm industry's" motive for scare tactics?

Could it be scepticism over some Cities' unsubstantiated claims that Verifed Response is a panacea and a "cure for all ills?"

• Misguided public perception that not responding to alarms will increase crime

True, most reasonable people would assume that criminals are always looking for an easier target. If you announce to criminals that police no longer respond to alarm calls, it would logically follow that some reasonable people would translate this into increased opportunities for burglars.

PATH FORWARD

• Educate and gain support (among council members, DPD leadership, city management, police associations, media and citizens)

Before the City lobbies council members, DPD leadership, city management, associations, media and citizens, shouldn't it do it's homework?  

Shouldn't "education" include valid figures and substantial research?

The City of Dallas Verified Response proposal, by its own numbers, eliminates $2.3 million dollars of existing revenue--and an existing, self-funding program.

It punishes businesses, and demonizes the alarm industry while not providing facts to support a single benefit.

It further appears to accept a double-digit increase in burglaries as "OK."

What the City should be saying is "we don't know" what impact Verified Response will have on our citizens.  The data is simply insufficient to draw any other conclusion.  To assume otherwise may well be a dangerous risk in an already high-crime city.

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OUR CONCLUSIONS

Mixed in with all the hogwash, the city has identified the real issue as "managing" false alarm calls.  The problem is management, and the City's proposal is nothing more than a bureaucrat's solution and "sales job" without any hard data to back up claims.

By the City's own numbers, the alarm permit program currently pays for all its own costs--including false alarms.  It further generates a surplus of $467,900.

As far as data, simply using the FBI's UCR burglary statistics over two or 3 years is insufficient to analyze and judge the impact of "verified response." 

These statistics fail to include (or track) other alarm-identified crimes such as trespassing and criminal mischief.  There is also no data to show what other types of crimes may hence go unreported because police no longer respond to alarm calls.

That being said, the City points out a two-year upward trend in burglaries after implementing the program in other cities, calling it "similar to past cyclical trends." This appears to indicate that the City acknowledges and is willing to accept a double-digit increase in burglaries as "acceptable losses".

The FBI's UCR burglary data also shows net increases over the period in burglaries tied to both cities (Las Vegas and Salt Lake City) used as examples supporting Verified Response.

Los Angeles, the other city cited in the Dallas' presentation, opted not to implement Verified Response but rather to increase penalties for false alarms to $150.  Currently, the City of Dallas charges $50 per year for an alarm permit and allows up to 5 false alarms before issuing a citation.

This is the root cause of the problem.

Doubling businesses permit fees, followed by decreasing service levels to zero, amounts to nothing more than another punitive tax on Dallas' businesses.

Instead of risking "verified response," why not create two alarm classes and make the program, in essence, voluntary?  For example:

• Class 1 - Police First Response:
  
  • Alarm permit fee: $100. 
  • Fee per false alarm: $100.

• Class 2 - Verified Response:
  
  • Alarm permit fee: $10-$20 (enough to cover bureaucracy). 
  • Fee per false alarm: $100.

This fee structure gives citizens and businesses a choice.  It ensures that alarms and procedures will be fine-tuned such that false alarms will be minimized and police time will not be wasted.

Since the City's own numbers identify a cost of $57.98 per false alarm, a $100 false alarm fee more than funds the program.

Bottom line: verified response is an ill-conceived, poorly-planned reaction to an extraordinarily high statistical number. 

Better management, as opposed to hand-washing, can address the issue without introducing unknown factors that may well place Dallas citizens and businesses at risk.